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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

From the voluminous mass of income-tax rulings and decisions that
are published each month an attempt has been made to sort out those that
seemed of greatest importance to the greatest number. The commenting
upon all of them or the publication of all these rulings in their entirety has
never been contemplated because of the obvious impossibility of so doing.
Even those that have seemed to contain matter of outstanding importance
have at times piled up because of lack of space for their publication and
have, therefore, appeared at later dates than they otherwise would have
been printed. The Journal of Accountancy goes to press about the
fifteenth of the month and is mailed the first of the following month.
These conditions render it necessary to review and publish decisions and
rulings that seem old when they are read by the subscribers, and this fact
has been commented on by some of our readers. There have been times
when the comments and opinions expressed in these columns have been
misleading to our readers, because subsequent to their expression a later
ruling has been made diametrically opposed to the one upon which comment
was made.
An example of this is furnished by comments and opinion appearing
in the February issue of this periodical on treasury decision 3521, containing
a court decision upon the subject of “return of income for period of less
than 12 months—section 226 (c)—returns of income of decedent and of his
estate for year in which he dies.” The ruling contained in treasury
decision 3521 was reversed by the United States circuit court of appeals,
second circuit, on December 10, 1923; this later ruling was embodied in
treasury decision 3547, issued by the treasury department February 7, 1924,
and appears in the government’s publication, Treasury Decisions, dated
February 14th, a copy of which was received about February 20th, and is
published herein.
Realizing that comments upon and publication of a treasury decision
that has been reversed by the time this publication is delivered to its
readers is likely to be misleading and is not good service, an endeavor
will be made, henceforth, to correct this defect. Beginning, therefore, with
this issue the columns appertaining to income tax will contain brief sum
maries of the latest decisions available, as well as the important decisions
that are derived in the usual manner from the government publications.
An opinion was recently expressed that engagements coming to account
ants for federal income-tax matters will decrease materially within the
next three or four years and that the subject will become less important
to accountants because of the decreasing engagements. There is probably
some truth in this opinion, but when one remembers that at the present
time there are some forty thousand of the more important tax returns for the
year 1918 to be examined by the bureau of internal revenue, five years
after these returns were made; that there is a greater number to be
examined for each year since; that there seems to be no decrease in
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decisions upon the several revenue acts under which these returns were
made, it would seem that accountants will find plenty to do for years to
come in handling federal income-tax matters, and it will undoubtedly be
found desirable to keep informed upon this subject.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Department Circular No. 230 prohibits former employees of the
treasury department from appearing before it as counsel, attorney or agent
for prosecuting any claim against the United States, or in any manner, or
by any means to aid in such prosecution, within two years after they have
ceased to be such employees.
Treasury Decision No. 3451 extends the time to June 15, 1924, for
filing information returns as to dividends paid in 1923.
Court Decision in case of Cadwalader, et al., v. Edward L. Sturgess,
collector, denies injunction against collection of tax after expiration of
period of statute of limitations where assessment was made prior to close
of such period.
Court Decision in case of United States v. Brezin and Schaefer,
bankrupts, rules that one year limitation for filing claims against a bankrupt
does not apply to a claim of the United States and that such claims against
the individual partners can be satisfied out of partnership assets where
individual’s assets are insufficient but where partnership assets and salaries
left in the business are sufficient.
Court Decision in case of New Creek Company v. Lederer, collector,
rules that entire proceeds, including royalties to a lessor, derived from the
mining of coal, constitutes gross income;
That a mining corporation which in consideration of certain royalties,
grants the right to extract ore from its land is not entitled as an inherent
right to any deduction from gross income for depletion, and the right to
such deduction depends upon the statutory provisions of the taxing act.
The revenue act of 1916 as amended provides a reasonable allowance
for depletion and delegates to the secretary of the treasury the power to
prescribe the amount by appropriate regulations. The allowance for deple
tion provided by articles 171 and 172 of regulations No. 33 is reasonable.
The subjects comprehended in the foregoing summary of recent rulings
will be treated at length when the treasury decisions are received.
In these days when the government is seriously considering making
tax returns subject to inspection by certain congressional committees as
well as duly constituted officers of the several state governments, it is
interesting to learn through treasury decision 3546, that:
“The government has the right to require the employees or agents of
a bank who know facts as to deposits or investments or any dealings
of parties who owe income taxes, to testify to the entries made on the
books of the bank relating to such transactions.”
In the February issue of The Journal of Accountancy treasury
decision No. 3521 was published. This decision embodied a court decision
by Judge Goddard of the United States district court, southern district of
New York, in which it was held by the court that
“when a taxpayer dies during his taxable year, the return of his income
and the return of the income of his estate for the said year are returns
for a period of less than 12 months within the meaning of section
226 (c) of the revenue act of 1921, and the respective incomes must be
placed upon an annual basis, as required thereby.”
This decision has been overruled by the United States court of appeals,
second district, and the later decision is embodied in treasury decision
3547, published herein.
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The latter court rules that:
“the tax upon the income of a decedent to the date of death and the
tax upon the income of an estate during the period of settlement
should be computed under the general provisions relating to returns
for a period of twelve months and not under section 226 (c), revenue
act of 1921, which applies to returns for a period of less than one year.”
Judge Goddard in reading section 226 concluded that paragraph (c) thereof
applied to cases independent of those referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b),
whereas Judge Manton held that section 226 was interdependent and that
paragraph (c) thereof amplifies and explains the previous paragraphs of
the said section, and does not apply to returns of income of a decedent and
of his estate.
TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3545—February 7, 1924)
Estate tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Gross Estate—Trust to take effect at Death.
Where the creator of a trust reserves the income for life, the value
of property passing under the instrument is part of the gross estate of the
creator within the wording of section 402 (c), revenue act of 1918.
2. Same—Consideration.
A release of dower incidental to the creation of a trust under the terms
of which the wife is to get one-sixth of the - corpus and undistributed
income does not constitute a bona fide sale for a fair consideration in
money or money’s worth within the meaning of section 402 (c), revenue
act of 1918.
The following decision of the United States district court for the
eastern district of Missouri, in the case of Mercantile Trust Co., guardian
of the estate of Tevis Reyburn and Florence K. Schill v. Arnold J. Hellmich, is published for the information of internal revenue officers and others
concerned.
District Court of the United States, Eastern Division of the Eastern
Judicial District of Missouri. No. 6451.
Mercantile Trust Co., guardian of the estate of Tevis Reyburn and Florence
K. Schill, plaintiffs, v. Arnold J. Hellmich, defendant.
MEMORANDUM opinion of the court.
Faris, judge: This case was submitted to the court a few days since
on a demurrer to the petition. The petition itself does not fully set forth
the trust agreement which forms the bone of contention. If the petition
stood absolutely alone, without the briefs of counsel in the case, it is highly
probable, as a strictly technical matter, that the demurrer ought to be
overruled merely because the facts upon which the demurrer is bottomed
do not appear in the petition. Both sides, however, in their briefs have
referred to the terms of the trust agreement. Both sides, both in their
arguments and their briefs, have seen fit to bottom the field of contention
absolutely upon the terms of that trust agreement. I think, then, that I
am warranted in considering the terms of that agreement, which were set
out fully in the brief of the defendant, and which is referred to in the
brief of the plaintiffs; in short, both sides consider the matter as turning
upon the terms of the trust agreement, and seem to concede the power of
this court regardless of the precise language of the petition itself, to
determine the matter upon a full consideration of the question of ultimate
liability.
On the 24th of June, 1912, one Amedee V. Reyburn, Jr., joined with his
wife, Florence, and who now seems to be Florence K. Schill, in a certain trust
agreement by which the settler of that trust, the said Reyburn, conveyed
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to the plaintiff, Mercantile Trust Co., in trust, all of his property. Under
the terms of that trust agreement, which took largely, if not wholly, the
form of the instrument commonly called a “spendthrift trust,” Reyburn
was to be paid the sum of $750 per month out of the net income for the
term of his natural life. If there were income over $750 per month such
income could, in the discretion of the trustee, Mercantile Trust Co., be
paid to the settler, or to any other person whom he might select.
At the death of the settler Reyburn the trust created in the Mercantile
Trust Co. ceased, or it was so provided in the trust agreement, and
thereupon one-sixth of the corpus and undistributed income of the trust
estate, it was provided, should go to and vest in Florence Kelley Reyburn,
now, as stated, Florence Kelley Schill.
There was a proviso to this provision, however, to the effect—
That if, after the date of this instrument and during the life of
said Amedee V. Reyburn, Jr., there shall not have been paid by the
said trustee, to or for the use of said Florence Kelley Reyburn, annually,
a sum equal to at least one-sixth of the annual net income distributed
by the trustee each year, then and in that event, instead of only the
foregoing one-sixth of the corpus and undistributed income, one-fourth
of the corpus and undistributed income of said trust estate shall go
to and vest in and be paid and delivered to Florence Kelley Reyburn,
absolutely and in fee simple, if she be then living.
It was provided further that all the balance and residue of the estate,
save and except that just referred to, should, upon the death of Amedee V.
Reyburn, Jr., vest in the legal heirs of said settler, and that each stirpes
should share equally.
The settler died about the year 1920 leaving, it seems, only one grand
daughter surviving him, who seems to be Tevis Reyburn, for whom the
Mercantile Trust Co. is guardian, and for whom the Mercantile Trust Co.
sues here.
I think there can be no question that, so far as regards the property
held by the Mercantile Trust Co. for Tevis Reyburn, that the tax paid, a
recovery of which is here sought, was correctly paid, and can not be
recovered. But little contention seems to be made touching that proposition.
Clearly, the property which came to Tevis Reyburn came to her only upon
the death of the settler. If this be true, then there can be no question that
the Mercantile Trust Co. was entitled to pay to the defendant here the
inheritance tax sought here to be recovered back, so far as concerns such
part of that payment as was due from Tevis Reyburn.
The statute on which the tax in this case was imposed and paid first
provides for the levying of a certain percentage of tax in favor of the
United States, upon the net estate of every decedent dying after the passage
of the act. This provision is found in section 401 of the act of 1918
(40 Stat. 1057).
Section 402, subdivision (c), provides for the levy of this tax—
To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has at any time
created a trust, in contemplation of, or intended to take effect in pos
session or enjoyment at or after his death, whether such transfer or
trust is made or created before or after the passage of this act, except
in case of a bona fide sale for a fair consideration in money or money’s
worth.
As stated, upon the facts presented in this controversy, there is abso
lutely no question that so much of this estate as has come to Tevis Reyburn,
and which was taxed, was liable to this tax, for, clearly, the estate came
to her only after the death of the settler. So much seems to be conceded,
but the contention is made in behalf of Florence Kelley Schill that she
ought to recover back the amount paid to defendant by her because there
was a bona fide sale for a fair consideration, in money or money’s worth,
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to her. This proposition is bottomed upon the theory that when Florence
Kelley Schill, as the wife of the settler, joined in the trust agreement she
inevitably conveyed away from herself all dower rights in the property,
and in effect she took, by the provisions of that trust agreement, upon the
death of her husband, the settler, other property, namely, a one-sixth
interest in the estate, which was less than the statutory one-third, and that
therefore the conveyance of her dower was in fact a bona fide sale to the
trustee in trust for a fair consideration, in money or money’s worth, and
that therefore she falls within- the exception of the statute named.
I think, however, that a fair reading of the trust agreement shows
conclusively that Florence Kelley Schill benefited by the trust agreement;
that she was helped and not hurt by the making of it. In short, that she
took more, perforce its terms, than she would have taken had she not
made it and relied upon the provisions made for her by the Missouri
statutes touching dower. That, however, will not necessarily settle the
case. A further consideration comes in, and that is whether such a sale,
such a conveyance of dower (which, it will be noted, happened only inci
dentaly in this case), falls within the purview of that bona fide sale for
a fair consideration in money mentioned in the exception contained in the
statute. I am of the opinion that it does not. Florence Kelley Schill,
while joining in the trust agreement with the settler, necessarily conveyed
her dower interest, but such a conveyance, in my view, does not constitute
a bona fide sale for a fair consideration in money. The language “fair
consideration in money” has been construed by various courts of the United
States. The definition of the term, in my opinion, does not include a
situation similar to that here presented.
I think the demurrer ought to be sustained, and so it will be ordered.
(T. D. 3546—February 7, 1924)
General administrative provisions—Revenue act of 1921—Decision of court.
1. Examination of Books and Records.
The government has the right to require the employees or agents of a
bank who know facts as to deposits or investments or any dealings of
parties who owe income taxes to testify to the entries made on the books
of the bank relating to such transactions.
2. Same—Constitutional Rights—Searches and Seizures.
The fourth amendment to the constitution, which prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures, does not authorize a third person who has books and
papers which may be relevant to federal tax liability to refuse to produce
such books or papers and testify as to the facts.
The following decision of the United States district court for the
southern district of Alabama in the case of United States v. First National
Bank of Mobile is published for the information of internal-revenue officers
and others concerned.
United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.
United States v. First National Bank of Mobile.
Ervin, district judge: This is a petition filed under section 1310 of
the revenue act of 1921, volume 43, part 1, of the public laws of 1921-23,
page 312, asking the assistance of the court to require the First National
Bank to furnish information as to the transactions had by William J.
Hanlon and his wife, Annie E. Hanlon, with the bank involving deposits
of money arid investments by said Hanlon and his wife.
Section 1308 provides:
That the commissioner, for the purpose of ascertaining the cor
rectness of any return or for the purpose of making a return where
none has been made, is hereby authorized, * * * to examine any books,
papers, records, or memoranda bearing upon the matters required to
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be included in the return, and may require the attendance of the person
rendering the return or of any officer or employee of such person, or
the attendance of any other person having knowledge in the premises,
and may take his testimony with reference to the matter required by
law to be included in such return, with power to administer oaths to
such person or persons. (Italics mine.)
Section 1310 (a) provides:
That if any person is summoned under this act to appear, to testify,
or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the
United States for the district in which such person resides shall have
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testi
mony, or production of books, papers, or other data.
Section 1300 provides:
And every person liable to any tax imposed by this act, or for the
collection thereof, shall keep such records and render, under oath, such
statements and returns, and shall comply with such regulations as the
commissioner, with the approval of the secretary, may from time to
time prescribe.
The petition sets out that the said Hanlon and his wife have not made
full, true, and correct statements of their respective incomes of the years
1918, 1919, 1920, 1921, and 1922, and that the ledgers and other books of
the bank containing the accounts of the said Hanlons will be of material
assistance to the United States in arriving at the true and correct incomes
of said individuals of the respective years. That summons to appear and
testify and produce the books had been served on D. P. Bester, Jr., as
president of the bank and that the said bank and its officers had failed to
appear at the time and place designated in the summons and they now
refuse to appear and permit the duly authorized agents of the internal
revenue of the United States to have access in any manner to the records
and accounts of said bank and prays for the assistance of the court to
require the bank officers and employees to testify and the bank to produce
its books and accounts.
Said bank refuses to testify and produce the books and contends that
they are protected by the fourth amendment to the constitution from doing
so. As I understand the fourth amendment, it protects the parties to criminal
prosecution against unreasonable searches and seizures of their papers, and
I do not understand this to authorize a third party who has books and
papers which may be relevant to the inquiry, to refuse to produce such
books and papers because of this amendment.
This is not a question of a search and seizure of a party’s books and
papers but of whether a witness who has information as to a party’s deal
ings may be required to testify to those facts and produce book entries as
to such entries in connection with and supporting such testimony.
The bank further contends that there is no specific showing of any
deposits or investments by the Hanlons or to the materiality of the books
and entries in the bank accounts against said Hanlon. It is true that such
entries as may be found in the bank’s books without more are inadmissible
against Hanlon and wife as showing any income received by them, but
the bank not only refuses to produce the books but refuses to have its
president testify as to the facts.
Many cases have been read to me where evidence had been sought under
subpoena duces tecum and objection has been made that no showing of the
materiality and relevancy of this evidence had been made. In the present
matter, however, it appears clear to me that if Hanlon and wife are shown
by the testimony of the agents and employees of the bank to have deposited
funds in the bank at various dates and to have made investments in securi
ties that the entries in the books in connection with the testimony of the
officers and agents of the bank as to transactions will be both material and
relevant against Hanlon and his wife to show moneys or income which
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they had received. It is not necessary to say that many accounts in the
bank are accounts of parties who handle money for other parties and don’t
show any individual receipt of income in such cases of fiduciary funds.
These transactions, of course, like those of use of funds coming in fiduciary
relation can be explained, but until explained they tend to show income
received. Nor is it any excuse for refusing to testify and give the facts
to say that moneys which pass through a man’s bank account are not
always income received by him. This may be conceded, and yet it is
evidence from which income can be inferred and does tend to show income.
Like other transactions, however, it may be explained by Hanlon and wife.
It is monstrous, it seems to me, to say that because sometimes money
which is deposited in banks doesn’t show income and because the bank
desires to protect the dealings of its customers from unauthorized inves
tigation by third parties that the government could not inquire as to the
moneys of its citizens who owe income taxes and trace these moneys
through its various agencies, such as national banks, in order to ascertain
the correct income tax that is owing by the citizen.
For these reasons I am of the opinion that the government has the
right to require any of the employees or agents of a bank who know facts
as to deposits or investments or any dealings of parties who owe income
taxes to testify to the entries made on the books of the bank as to such
transactions so the government may be correctly informed as far as possible
of the income which has been received by its citizens.
An order will therefore be issued ordering the bank to furnish the
information desired.
(T. D. 3547—February 7, 1924)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1921—Decision of court.
Income of Decedent—Income of Estate—Returns—Computation.
The tax upon the income of a decedent to the date of death and the
tax upon the income of an estate during the period of settlement should
be computed under the general provisions relating to returns for a period
of twelve months and not under section 226 (c), revenue act of 1921, which
applies to returns for a period of less than one year.
The following decision of the United States circuit court of appeals
for the second circuit, in the case of Bankers Trust Co. et al., executors
of Glackner v. Bowers, collector, is published for the information of
internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. No. 173.
October Term, 1923.
(Argued November 12, 1923. Decided December 10, 1923.)
Bankers Trust Co. and Frederick H. Pearce, as executors of the last will
and testament of John Glackner, deceased, complainants-appellants, v.
Frank K. Bowers, as collector of internal revenue for the second district
of New York, defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern
District of New York.
Before Rogers, Manton, and Mayer, Circuit Judges.
Writ of error to the United States district court for the southern district
of New York. Action by Bankers Trust Co. and Frederick H. Pearce,
as executors of the last will and testament of John Glackner, deceased,
complainants, v. Frank K. Bowers, as collector of internal revenue for
the second district of New York, defendant. Judgment for defendant.
Plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.
Joseph M. Hatfield, Esq., counsel for appellants.
Victor House, Esq., Assistant United States Attorney, counsel for
appellee.
William R. Conklin, Esq., as counsel for parties similarly situated.
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Manton, circuit judge: We shall refer to the parties as below, plain
tiffs and defendant.
The plaintiffs have appealed from a judgment at law. Their remedy
on appeal is by writ of error, and we shall treat their appeal as a writ of
error pursuant to the act of September 6, 1916 (chap. 448, sec. 4, 39 Stat.
727), ignoring the mistake and regarding the action taken as appropriate
so as to bring the cause here for review.
John Glackner died April 4, 1921, leaving a will which was duly admit
ted to probate and the plaintiffs qualified as his executors. On March 15
1922, they filed two income-tax returns. One reported the net income of
decedent during the calendar year of 1921 and the other the net income
received by the plaintiffs as executors during the same calendar year. The
first cause of action set forth in the complaint is for a tax paid upon the
basis of the return filed for the decedent. It alleges that the correct tax
liability of the decedent for the calendar year 1921 was $269.44 and that
the defendant demanded and was paid on account of this tax $1,560.04;
that $1,290.60 of said tax was paid under protest and duress and a claim
for the refund thereof was subsequently rejected by the commissioner of
internal revenue. The second cause of action sets forth a tax paid upon a
basis of the return reporting the net income received by the executors in
1921. The correct tax is alleged as $2,050.27, whereas there was demanded
and paid $2,633.85; of this amount $583.58 was paid under protest and a
claim for refund was denied by the commissioner of internal revenue. The
tax collected and paid was computed by the internal revenue commissioner
under a construction of section 226 (c) of the revenue act of 1921. On
motion made by the defendant that the complaint did not state a cause of
action, the complaint was dismissed, the court delivering an opinion which
supported the claim of the government as to the amount of the taxes. The
question raised on this review is whether the taxes in question should have
been determined in the manner described in section 226 (c) of the revenue
act of 1921 or by other provisions of the act referred to herein. Section
226 reads as follows:
(a) That if a taxpayer, with the approval of the commissioner,
changes the basis of computing net income from fiscal year to calen
dar year a separate return shall be made for the period between the
close of the last fiscal year for which return was made and the fol
lowing December 31. If the change is from calendar year to fiscal
year, a separate return shall be made for the period between the close
of the last calendar year for which return was made and the date
designated as the close of the fiscal year. If the change is from one
fiscal year to another fiscal year a separate return shall be made for
the period between the close of the former fiscal year and the date
designated as the close of the new fiscal year.
(b) In all cases where a separate return is made for a part of a
taxable year the net income shall be computed on the basis of such
period for which separate return is made, and the tax shall be paid
thereon at the rate for the calendar year in which such period is
included.
(c) In the case of a return for a period of less than 1 year the
net income shall be placed on an annual basis by multiplying the
amount thereof by 12 and dividing by the number of months included
in such period; and the tax shall be such part of a tax computed on
such annual basis as the number of months in such period is of 12
months.
Subdivision (c) of section 226 applied only to computing tax in case
of a return for a period of less than 1 year, and the district court has held
that returns necessary to be filed by the plaintiffs were returns for a period
of less than a year and that the tax liability was properly determined
applying the statutory formula of (1) multiplying the net income by 12;
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(2) dividing the product so obtained by the number of months and fraction
thereof in the period covered by the return; (3) computing the normal
and surtax on the quotient; and (4) dividing the total tax so computed
by 12 and multiplying the quotient by the number of months and fraction
thereof in the period covered by the return.
The statute and regulations of the department, apart from section
226 (c), contain a complete scheme for the filing of income-tax returns
of decedents and their estates. We must accept the fact that income-tax
statutes are designed and intended to reach actual income received by the
taxpayer. Section 213 (a) defining gross income points this out in
providing:
Includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or
compensation for personal service (including in the case of the Presi
dent of the United States, the judges of the supreme and inferior
courts of the United States, and all other officers and employees,
whether elected or appointed, of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii,
or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, the
compensation received as such), of whatever kind and in whatever
form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, com
merce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal,
growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property;
also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any
business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income
derived from any source whatever. The amount of all such items
(except as provided in subdivision (e) of section 201) shall be
included in the gross income for the taxable year in which received
by the taxpayer, unless, under methods of accounting permitted under
subdivision (b) of section 212, any such amounts are to be properly
accounted for as of a different period.
Section 212 defines net income as meaning the gross income as defined
in section 213 less the deductions allowed by section 214 and subdivision (b)
thereof provides that the net income shall be computed upon the basis of
the taxpayer’s annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year, as
the case may be) in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer. Actual income was to
be taxed—not constructive or hypothetical. The plaintiffs argue that the
return was not a return for a period of less than one year within section
226 (a) and that the tax should be computed by the ordinary method pre
scribed for the computation of income tax. The plaintiffs base this writ of
error upon the nonapplicability of section 226 and urge that if it applies it
is unconstitutional for the reason that in operation it would tax as income
that which does not constitute income within the sixteenth amendment of
the constitution and therefore violates the provisions of article 1, section 2,
clause 3, and article 1, section 9, clause 4, of the constitution; also if so
construed, it would violate the fifth amendment of the constitution. In the
view we take, it will be unnecessary to consider the constitutional questions
presented. This, for the reason that section 2, subdivision (c) provides
solely for the placing of income on an annual basis and for computation
of the tax thereon in the case of a return for a period of less than one
year where the change is made voluntarily by the taxpayer or pursuant to
an order of the commissioner. The fundamental scheme of title 2 of the
revenue act is for a tax upon the net income of the taxpayer during an
accounting period of 12 successive months. This general accounting period
seems to be a predetermined measure to be applied to a taxpayer as income
and is not affected by his death or change of status within the period. The
tax is imposed upon the entire net income for such period and the return
of such income constitutes his return for the period of 12 full months,
even though he may have lived only a portion thereof. The exception to
this is where a voluntary change is made in the accounting period by the
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taxpayer or where it becomes involuntary in so far as the taxpayer is
concerned by the commissioner’s declaring the taxable period terminated
under section 250 (g). Sections 210 and 211 impose a normal tax and
surtax for each taxable year upon net income of the individual. A taxable
year, a term applied to the general accounting period, is by section 200
defined as follows:
(1) The term “taxable year” means the calendar year, or the
fiscal year ending during such calendar year, upon the basis of which
the net income is computed under section 212 or section 232. The term
“fiscal year” means an accounting period of 12 months ending on the
last day of any month other than December. The first taxable year, to
be called the taxable year 1921, shall be the calendar year 1921 or any
fiscal year ending during the calendar year 1921.
The basis for computing the net income of individuals is found in
section 212 and provides:
(b) The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the tax
payer’s annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year, as the
case may be) in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no such method
of accounting has been so employed, or if the method employed does
not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made upon
such basis and in such manner as in the opinion of the commissioner
does clearly reflect the income. If the taxpayer’s annual accounting
period is other than a fiscal year as defined in section 200 or if the
taxpayer has no annual accounting period or does not keep books, the
net income shall be computed on the basis of the calendar year.
(c) If a taxpayer changes his accounting period from fiscal year
to calendar year, from calendar year to fiscal year, or from one fiscal
year to another, the net income shall, with the approval of the com
missioner, be computed on the basis of such new accounting period,
subject to the provisions of section 226.
Thus it will be observed that except where a voluntary change is made,
the accounting period is 12 months which becomes the taxable year. And,
so that the commissioner of internal revenue may have the necessary infor
mation for determining the tax liability upon this basis, returns are to be
filed under section 223 (1) by individuals having a net income for the
taxable year equal to or in excess of specific sums; (2) by partnerships
for each taxable year; and (3) by fiduciaries for individuals, estates, or
trusts having income equal to or in excess of specified sums for the taxable
year. The time of filing is given by section 227 as:
(a) That returns (except in the case of nonresident aliens) shall
be made on or before the fifteenth day of the third month following
the close of the fiscal year, or, if the return is made on the basis of the
calendar year, then the return shall be made on or before the 15th day
of March. In the case of a nonresident alien, individual returns shall
be made on or before the fifteenth day of the sixth month following
the close of the fiscal year, or, if the return is made on the basis of
the calendar year, then the return shall be made on or before the 15th
day of June. * * *
No time other than the close of the calendar or fiscal year is fixed.
By section 225 “any fiduciary required to make a return under this act shall
be subject to all the provisions of the act which apply to individuals.”
Section 219 entitled “Estates and Trusts,” does not require filing returns
for less than one year and subdivision (a) thereof provides that taxes
imposed by section 210 and section 211 apply to income of estates and
trusts. It reads:
(1) Income received by estates of deceased persons during the
period of administration or settlement of the estate;
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(2) Income accumulated in trust for the benefit of unborn or
unascertained persons or persons with contingent interests;
(3) Income held for future distribution under the terms of the
will or trust; and
(4) Income which is to be distributed to the beneficiaries period
ically, whether or not at regular intervals, and the income collected
by a guardian of an infant to be held or distributed as the court may
direct.
By subdivision (b) “The net income of the estate or trust shall be
computed in the same manner and on the same basis as provided in
section 212.”
The executors here have made a return of income received and paid
taxes for the estate “during the period of administration or settlement”
and by subdivision (c), “the tax shall be imposed upon the net income of
the estate or trust and shall be paid by the fiduciary, except that in
determining the net income of the estate of any deceased person during
-the period of administration or settlement there may be deducted the
amount of any income properly paid or credited to any legatee, heir, or
other beneficiary. In such cases the estate or trust shall, for the purpose
of the normal tax, be allowed the same credits as are allowed to single
persons under section 216.”
We therefore observe that section 219 (b) expressly required that the
net income shall be computed in the same manner and on the same basis
as provided in section 212 and that section 212 provides for an accounting
of twelve full months. The only exception being in the case alone where
“the net income shall, with the approval of the commissioner, be computed
on the basis of such new accounting period, subject to the provisions of
section 226.”
The plaintiffs allege their accounts as executors were kept on the
calendar-year basis, and upon this basis they are taxable pursuant to section
219. We find nothing in the act making returns filed for decedents or
estates exceptions to the general rule. The plaintiffs in their returns for
the decedent and his estate did not elect to change the accounting period
nor is there any attempt to defeat the collection of the tax which might
invoke either of the sections above referred to. Therefore, not falling within
either of the exceptions above, they would be improperly considered if
returned for less than a year. The time of receipt of income or the ability
to receive income has no bearing upon the accounting period. A taxpayer
may receive his income for the year on the first day of the year. He may
become a nonresident alien during the year without property in or income
from any source in the United States. As an alien, he may have come to
this country during the first taxable year and he may have attained his
majority or become incompetent during the year. When during the year
his status changes and he becomes a taxpayer, or ceases to be one, is
immaterial. If he received taxable income during any part of that year
and kept his books on a calendar-year basis, a return is required of all such
income derived from or received within the twelve months of such calen
dar year and the return is for a period of twelve months. Here the plain
tiffs reported all the taxable income received by the decedent during the
calendar year 1921. And in their return, they reported all the taxable
income received by the estate of the decedent during the same calendar
year 1921. The estate and deceased were separate entities, each having a
separate accounting. Because their books were kept for the calendar year
1921, it required them to return for that year. It was possible for the estate
to have kept its books on a fiscal-year basis. A different period might then
have been called for. The return filed for the decedent was one of the
returns required to be filed by the fiduciaries and for “an individual”
having a net income for the taxable year of “$1,000 or over” under
section 225, and the estate return was required for “every estate or trust
the net income of which for the taxable year is $1,000 or over” under the
same section.
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The decedent and his estate have long been regarded as separate
taxable entities. In Mandell v. Pierce (16 Fed. Cas. 516, case No. 99008),
arising under the act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. L. ch. 173), an executor
sought to recover a tax collected on the income received by the decedent
from January 1, 1865, to July 2, 1865, the date of his death. The plaintiff
argued that the income tax was imposed on an annual income and the act
required no return to be filed by an executor where the deceased died
before the time appointed for the filing of the return. In sustaining the tax,
the court said it was imposed upon the income received within the income
year and that the income received by the decedent within the income-year
constituted “annual gains, profits, and income” within the meaning of the
act, holding that “gains, profits, and income received within the income
year are annual gains, profits, and income within the meaning of those
laws, although the whole amount of the same in a given case may be
received within the first month or the last month of the year.” And further
“When ascertained as required by law, the intention of congress was that
gains, profits and income received within the income year, from the sources
therein defined, should be subject to the prescribed taxation, whether such
gains, profits, or income were derived from any kind of property, rents,
interest, dividends, salaries, or from any trade, profession, employment,
vocation, owned, collected, pursued, or followed for the whole or any part
of the income-year.”
Subdivision (f) of section 216 provides:
The credits allowed by subdivisions (c), (d) and (e) of this section
shall be determined by the status of the taxpayer on the last day of the
period for which the return of income is made; but in the case of an indi
vidual who dies during the taxable year, such credits shall be determined
by his status at the time of his death, and in such case full credits shall
be allowed to the surviving spouse, if any, according to his or her status
at the close of the period for which such survivor makes return of income.
This section indicates it was not the intention of congress that the
date of death be the last day of the period for which the decedent’s return
is filed. If congress wanted to include within section 226 (c) decedent’s
and other estates, it might have done so in appropriate language.
Reading section 226 as a whole, it is clear that the purpose was to
present a single unified plan for computing tax liability of a taxpayer who
voluntarily changed his accounting period. Subdivision (a) provides for
making of separate returns covering a period of less than 12 months in
case of a taxpayer who, with the consent of the commissioner, changes his
accounting period, and this is the only provision providing for a change of
accounting period except section 250 (g). Subdivision (b) merely pro
vides that in all cases where separate returns are made for part of the
taxable year, the return shall include the taxpayer’s income during the
period covered by the separate return and that the tax rate of the calendar
year in which the period falls is applicable. The use of the phrase “all
cases” undoubtedly applies to cases where separate returns are required
under subdivision (a). Having provided the periods to be covered by
returns in the case of a change in voluntary periods and in income to be
accounted for in returns and the tax rate applicable thereto, subdivision (c)
provides for the computation of the tax on an annual basis. The returns
required under subdivision (a) are returns for a period of less than one
year, and it is clear from the context that subdivision (c) was intended
to apply to such returns alone. There was nothing in subdivision (c)
which would indicate a purpose to create a new and extensive class of
returns such as those in the instant case, for a period of less than one year.
We regard subdivision (b) and (c) as interrelated. Subdivision (b)
assumes that the period covered by the return will fall within a Single
calendar year, for it provides that tax shall be paid at the rate for the
calendar year in which such period is included.
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In case of a voluntary change of the accounting period, the period of
less than one year will necessarily fall within a single calendar year in
the case of a taxpayer who renders returns on a fiscal-year basis. How
ever, the period from the beginning of the fiscal year to the date of his
death may very well fall within two calendar years. So it is with executors
who may keep their books on a fiscal-year basis, in which case the period
from the date of the decedent’s death to the end of the fiscal year may
fall within two calendar years. If congress had considered returns for
decedents and for their estates to constitute “a separate return * * *
for a part of a taxable year,” subdivision (b) would have made provision
for the application of the rates of taxes for the calendar year in which
the periods covered by the returns were included. The revenue act
nowhere contains a provision or computation of a tax in the case of a
return for a period commencing in one calendar year and terminating the
following calendar year other than at the close of a fiscal year. It is only
in section 205 in which provision is made for a tax where a tax shall be
computed in case of fiscal years beginning in 1920 and ending in 1921 or
beginning in 1921 and ending in 1922, but there fiscal years only are
covered. Therefore, subdivision (c), which provides for the method of
computing the tax applying the rates provided in subdivision (b), could
not apply to returns for decedents or their estates. Again, subdivision (c)
in providing for the placing of a net income on an annual basis refers
solely to the number of months included in such period. This language is
entirely inappropriate where death occurs on any date during the month
and no provision is made for computation which would include a period
covering a fraction of a month. The language used is entirely appropriate
in cases of returns filed under subdivision (a) for a month, for such
returns would not include a fraction of a month.
In interpreting a statute, the construction placed thereon should avoid
unjust consequences unless the language compels such a result and a con
struction should be had with reference both to the history of the legisla
tion and to other sections of the law with which it is in pari materia—
Gutschalk v. Peck (261 Fed. 212). The congressional reports and the legis
lative history of section 226 are of interest. Under the act of 1918, section
226, a taxpayer, with the approval of the commissioner, was permitted to
change his accounting period, which adjustment necessitated a return for
a period for less than one year. The filing of a return for a shorter period
resulted in a subsequent saving in surtaxes and made a change in the
accounting periods of decided advantage to the taxpayer. This result was
unfair to the taxpayers who did not change their accounting periods or
who could not show a basis therefor, as well as unfair to the government.
It was remedied by the present act (sec. 226-c) as finally enacted. The
purpose of the proposed amendment was stated in the report of the com
mittee on ways and means accompanying H. R. 8245:
Section 232: Under existing law the taxpayer may improperly
reduce his surtax by changing his fiscal year, thus splitting his annual
income into two parts. This section proposes to prevent such evasion
by providing that in the case of a return for a period of less than
one year the net income shall be placed on an annual basis and the
surtax properly computed thereon in accordance with the number of
months in such period.
In the original house bill the subdivisions of section 226 were not
separately numbered or lettered, and the insertion by the senate of the
distinguishing letters (a), (b), and (c) was described in the statement
attached to the conference report as “a clerical change.” It is apparent
that this was done solely for convenience and not with the intention of
separating subdivision (c) from its context. In the house bill section
226 (d) began with the words “in all of the above cases.” This was
changed by the senate amendment No. 346 to read “in all cases where a
separate return is made for a part of a taxable year.” This amendment
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was adopted in conference and states: “Amendment No. 346: This amend
ment is a clerical change; and the house recedes.”
In the 1918 act, the title of section 226 was “Returns when account
ing period changed.” This bill was changed in the original house amend
ment and in the title as reported by the senate finance committee by
amendment proposed on the floor of the senate and adopted without debate,
the title of the section was changed to “Return for a period of less than
twelve months” (61 Congressional Record, 7917-18). The amended title
was printed in the draft of the bill accompanying the conference report.
The conference report refers to the senate amendment No. 345 (reënact
ing section 226 (a) with the amended title) as follows:
This amendment is a clerical change made necessary by the repeal
and reënactment of the revenue act of 1918 instead of its amendment
in specified particulars, as explained in connection with amendment
No. 3; and the house recedes.
There is nothing of the legislative history of section 226 which indi
cates a contrary interpretation than that which we have given it, and the
conference report argues forcibly that congress had in mind returns
expressly referred to in subdivision (a) when it enacted subdivision (c)
thereof. The interpretation of statutes levying taxes must not extend
beyond their provisions by implication, nor must they be interpreted
beyond the clear import of the language used. In case of doubt, they are
interpreted strongly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.
—United States v. Wigglesworth (2 Story, 369) ; American Net & Twine
Co. v. Worthington (141 U. S. 468); Bensiger v. United States (192 U. S.
38) ; Gould v. Gould (245 U. S. 151); Smietanka v. First Trust & Savings
Bank (257 U. S. 602). The taxpayer may change his accounting period
under section 226 as he will and may stand the disadvantage of the tax.
Inequity would flow in following the formula proposed for taxation under
section 226 (a), if applied to a decedent and his estate, particularly if the
practice was indulged in of using the month and a fraction of a month in
calculating the income. Where a construction of a statute will occasion
great inconvenience or produce inequality or injustice, that view is to be
vetoed if another and more reasonable interpretation is present in the
statute.—Knowlton v. Moore (178 U. S. 41) ; Bate Refrigerating Co. v.
Sulzberger (157 U. S. 37).
We think the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for the
recovery of the tax in question and that it was error to grant the motion
for judgment.
Judgment reversed.

Edwin J. Bishop
Edwin J. Bishop, member of the American Institute of Accountants,
certified public accountant of Minnesota and member of the firm of
Bishop, Brissman & Co., died at St. Luke’s Hospital, St. Paul, Minnesota,
February 14, 1924. Mr. Bishop had been in the accounting field for many
years and was a sincere believer in the highest ideals of his profession.
He was highly esteemed by those with whom he came in contact and had
done much for the advancement of the profession in the Northwest.

W. T. Woodbridge
W. T. Woodbridge, member American Institute of Accountants, mem
ber of the firm of W. T. Woodbridge & Co., died at the Presbyterian
Hospital, Santurce, P. R., February 7, 1924.
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